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Introduction 
 A young man sits at a table with cameras everywhere and three hats in front of him.  
Each hat represents a different college; a college that offered him an athletic scholarship and a 
spot on the school’s football team.  After some hesitation he picks up a hat and puts it on his 
head.  The decision is made; he is going to Ole Miss.
1
  
What was once just a run of the mill occurrence has, in recent years, morphed into a 
quasi-holiday for many people.  The holiday’s name – signing day.  National signing day, which 
typically transpires during the first week of February, is the day when senior high school football 
                                                 
1
 THE BLIND SIDE (Warner Bros. 2009). 
2 
stars announce what college they will attend in the fall;
2
 rather, what college they will play 
football for.  It is a day full of anticipation, fanfare and celebration, and it is all covered live on 
ESPN.   
One of the driving factors behind where many high school seniors, not just student 
athletes, matriculate for college is money.
3
  How much is the school’s tuition?  Did school X 
give more scholarship money than school Y?  What are the terms for keeping the money?  For 
student athletes, the pressures are that much greater.  In addition to the typical questions 
regarding costs and financial aid, there are concerns about coaching changes, potential injuries, 
team performance, and the possibility of a new class of recruits making an athlete obsolete.
4
 
Former National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Article/Bylaw 15,
5
 which 
governed all aspects of financial aid for Division I student athletes, contained specific provisions 
limiting the amount and timing of aid permitted.  Bylaw 15.3.3.1 permitted colleges in Division I 
to award a student athlete a scholarship for one year at a time, the “one-year scholarship rule.”6  
Scholarships were renewable for up to five out of the six possible years of NCAA eligibility,
7
 but 
                                                 
2
 Matt Dollinger, It’s National Signing Day!, THIS JUST IN (Feb. 2, 2011, 1:31 PM), 
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/02/02/si-com-its-national-signing-day/.  
3
 See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672-73 (3rd Cir. 1993). “The district court found that colleges and 
universities traditionally use financial aid to recruit desirable students and that students and their families are heavily 
influenced by the amount of financial aid schools offer.” 
4
 See Eric Reinauer, Agnew v. NCAA: An End to the Subjective Scholarship?, C. SPORTS BUS. NEWS, (May 15, 
2011), http://collegesportsbusinessnews.com/issue/may-2011/article/agnew-v-ncaa-an-end-to-the-subjective-
scholarship.  
5
 This Comment refers to NCAA Bylaw 15.3.3.1 as the “former” bylaw because, in light of the failed vote to 
override the DI multi-year scholarship legislation on February 17, 2012, the multi-year scholarship provision will be 
incorporated into the DI Manual. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Multiyear Scholarship Rule Narrowly Upheld, 
NCAA.ORG (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2012/february/multiyear+scholarship+rul
e+narrowly+upheld. [hereinafter Multiyear Scholarship Rule Narrowly Upheld]. 
6
 NCAA BYLAWS art.15.3.3.1, 2011–2012 NCAA DIVISION I Manual (2011), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D112.pdf. [hereinafter NCAA BYLAWS] (last visited Mar. 
19, 2012). 
7
 NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art.15.01.5(c). 
3 
renewal was dependent upon a number of factors, including the discretion of the team coach and 
athletic director.
8
 
In 2010 two events took place that focused attention on the one-year scholarship rule.  
First, on May 6, 2010 the NCAA announced that the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust 
Division was inquiring into the reasoning behind the bylaw concerning multi-year scholarships.
9
  
Second, on October 25, 2010, Joseph Agnew, a former Rice football player, filed suit against the 
NCAA alleging a “blatant price fixing agreement” concerning the limits on athletic scholarships 
that violated antitrust law.
10
 
Accordingly, this Comment will argue that the former NCAA bylaw prohibiting multi-
year grants-in-aid to student-athletes violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and that 
current and past student-athletes were previously harmed by the bylaw and Section 1 should 
provide recourse to address this harm.  Part I of this note will provide the relevant background 
information concerning the former NCAA bylaw prohibiting the award of multi-year athletic 
scholarships to student athletes and the pending legislation allowing multi-year scholarships.
11
  
Part II will look at the general tenets of antitrust law under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act  (Section 1) where the lawsuit is based upon an alleged conspiracy to restrain trade; 
including the types of restrictions analyzed and the applicable standards of analysis.  Part III of 
this note examines the history of antitrust analysis concerning both collegiate athletics and 
                                                 
8
 Behind the Blue Disk: How Do Athletic Scholarships Work?, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 
July 21, 2011, 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Behind+the+Blue+Disk/How+Do+Athletic+Schol
arships+Work. 
9
 Press Release, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, NCAA Statement on Department of Justice Inquiry (May 6, 2010), 
available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ncaa/ncaa/media+and+events/press+room/news+release+archive/2010/offici
al+statements/20100506+dept+of+justice+statement?pageDesign=old+news+releases+template. 
10
 Class Action Complaint at 1, Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2010 WL 4227288 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 
2010) (No. 10-cv-4804), ECF No. 1. 
11
 There are several different terms used to describe scholarships given to athletes, including “athletic scholarships,” 
“athletic aid,” “grants in aid,” and “athletic discounts.” For the purposes of this comment, the terms will be used 
interchangeably. 
4 
collegiate financial aid through an examination of two cases, National Collegiate Athletic 
Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma
12
 and United States v. Brown 
University.
13
 
 Part IV of this Comment analyzes the issue presented in Agnew v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, whether former NCAA bylaw 15.3.3.1 violates Section 1.  The issue will be 
analyzed in terms of whether an agreement was formed, what type of restraint was instituted, 
whether the NCAA controls the relevant market, and the extent, if any, of the injury to the 
potential plaintiffs.  Part V of this Comment focuses on the implications and potential 
ramifications of the pending NCAA legislation on scholarships.
14
  It discusses the possible 
adverse impact of the ruling on colleges and universities who, in order to remain competitive, 
would now have to award automatic multi-year athletic scholarships to student athletes.  Part VI 
concludes the Comment.  
I. Background 
A. NCAA’s Bylaw Prohibiting Multi-Year Athletic Scholarships 
The NCAA was founded in 1906 to protect student football players from commonly used 
“exploitive athletics practices” that threatened not only athlete safety but also the future of the 
sport itself.
15
  The Supreme Court has stated “since its inception in 1905, the NCAA has played 
an important role in the regulation of amateur collegiate sports.”16  In the century since its 
founding the NCAA has grown not only in size, from sixty-two initial member colleges to over 
                                                 
12
 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter Bd. of 
Regents]. 
13
 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
14
 Although “legislation” typically refers to a law or rule passed by the government, this Comment uses “legislation” 
when discussing the NCAA changes because the NCAA uses “legislation” when it refers to proposed or actual 
changes to rules and bylaws. See Multiyear Scholarship Rule Narrowly Upheld, supra note 5. 
15
 History, NCAA.ORG (Nov. 8, 2010), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/Who+We+Are/About+the+NCAA+history.  
16
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984). 
5 
one thousand today, but also in complexity.
17
  With three athletic divisions, twenty-three sports, 
more than one thousand schools, and upwards of four hundred thousand athletes,
18
 the NCAA is 
unquestionably the behemoth of college athletics and, as such, requires extensive and detailed 
regulations.  The 2011 – 2012 NCAA Division I (DI) Manual, which contains the organization’s 
constitution, operating bylaws and administrative bylaws, is over four hundred pages and 
regulates everything from eligibility requirements,
19
 to whether a student may retain frequent 
flyer miles gained through team travel.
20
 
In 1973 the NCAA enacted Bylaw 15.3.3.1,
21
 overturning a component of the 1956 grant-
in-aid legislation that had allowed four year grants, in an effort to reduce the spiraling costs of 
intercollegiate athletics.
22
  The purpose of the new bylaw was to both cut costs
23
 as well as 
ensure that only the most deserving students received the limited number of scholarships 
available to athletes
24
 by prohibiting multi-year scholarships and requiring that all athletic 
scholarships be awarded for only a single year with the potential for renewal.
25
  Since the one-
                                                 
17
 History, NCAA.ORG (Nov. 8, 2010), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/Who+We+Are/About+the+NCAA+history. 
18
 Who We Are, NCAA.ORG (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/Who+We+Are/.  
19
 NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, art.14.1. 
20
 NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, art.16.11.1.12(b). 
21
 David Moltz & Doug Lederman, Are Athletics Scholarships Fair?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/05/10/ncaa.  
22
 JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY 46 (Digital Edition, 2006) available at, 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/in_the_arena584e1fee-ea5d-4487-be73-cb2f718232d9.pdf.   
“By 1973, though, institutions were feeling the financial pinch. Savings were available from passing a one-year 
grant-in-aid limit . . . Athletics had become a costly proposition for members. . . . Institutions had spent. The 
authorization of athletics grants had complemented this zeal. Increases in student-athlete numbers, in numbers of 
coaches, in recruitment expenditures, ancillary benefits to the players (separate and sometime luxurious athletics 
dormitories, for example) and other areas had precipitated a near financial crisis on some campuses.” Id. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Press Release, supra note 9. 
25
 NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, art.15.3.3.1. NCAA Bylaw 15.3.3.1 – One Year Period. “If a student’s athletic 
ability is considered in any degree in awarding financial aid, such aid shall neither be awarded for a period in excess 
of one academic year nor for a period less than one academic year.” 
6 
year rule was implemented, the question of whether financial aid for athletes “should be 
renewable or represent a four-year commitment” has never been fully settled.26  
On October 27, 2011, the NCAA DI Board of Directors adopted sweeping changes to 
various aspects of the division bylaws, including the scholarship provisions.
27
  The new 
legislation eliminates the one-year rule and moves back to the pre-1973 scholarship language 
allowing universities to provide multi-years grants to student athletes.
28
  The drastic change in 
NCAA policy is neither surprising nor sudden; rather, it is likely a response to the events of 
2010. 
 In May 2010, the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice informed 
the NCAA that the Department was interested in both the reasoning behind the one-year 
scholarship rule as well as the effect of the rule.
29
  While the Justice Department would not 
confirm the existence of the investigation,
30
 Bob Williams, an NCAA spokesman, stated that 
they were “working with the federal agency ‘to help it understand that athletics financial aid is a 
‘merit’ award’.”31 
When commenting on the issue, Gary Roberts, Dean of the Indiana University School of 
Law at Indianapolis, stated, “many of the NCAA’s bylaws, not just those governing scholarships, 
are meant to create parity among athletics programs.  But they are rules that, in any other 
context, could been seen as overly restrictive and possibly in violation of antitrust law.”32 
                                                 
26
 Libby Sander, Justice Department Examines NCAA Scholarship Rules, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 6, 
2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Justice-Department-Examines/65430/. 
27
 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Board Adopts Improvements in Academic Standards and Student-Athlete Support, 
NCAA.ORG (Oct. 27, 2011), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2011/october/di+board+of+directors+ado
pt+changes+to+academic+and+student-athlete+welfare. [hereinafter DI Board Adopts Improvements]. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Press Release, supra note 9; Sander, supra note 26. 
30
 Sander, supra note 26. 
31
 Press Release, supra note 9; Sander, supra note 26. 
32
 Sander, supra note 26. 
7 
B. Background of Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Association 
On October 25, 2010, Joseph Agnew, a former Rice University football player, filed suit 
against the NCAA in the United States District Court, Northern District of California, alleging 
that the NCAA’s bylaw restricting athletics based scholarships/grants-in-aid to one year violated 
the Sherman Antitrust Act.
33
 
Agnew, a highly recruited star high school football player,
34
 received formal offers from 
Rice University, Tulsa University, and Brigham Young University.
35
  In 2006, Agnew enrolled 
at Rice University
36
 and received an “athletics based discount” that equaled the yearly cost of his 
bachelor degree.
37
  After injuries and issues with playing time, however, Agnew lost his 
scholarship following his sophomore year.
38
  He appealed the decision, as per the NCAA 
Bylaws,
39
 and was able to have his scholarship reinstated for his junior year, even though he was 
not on the team.
40
  He did not receive a scholarship for his senior year.
41
 
The complaint alleged that the NCAA and its member institutions engaged in a “blatant 
price fixing agreement,”42 and that the member institutions have “unlawfully conspired to 
maintain the price of bachelor’s degrees for NCAA student-athletes at artificially high levels by 
(i) agreeing never to offer student-athletes a multi-year discount on the price of a bachelor’s 
degree and (ii) artificially reducing the total number of available athletics-based discounts by 
                                                 
33
 Class Action Complaint, supra note 10, at 1. 
34
 Class Action Complaint, supra note 10, at 2; Katie Thomas, N.C.A.A. Sued Over One-Year Scholarships, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2010, at B16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/sports/ncaafootball/26ncaa.html. 
35
 Class Action Complaint, supra note 10, at 2. 
36
 Thomas, supra note 34. 
37
 Class Action Complaint, supra note 10, at 2.  
38
 Id. at 10; Thomas, supra note 34. 
39
 NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, art.15.3.2.4. 
40
 Class Action Complaint, supra note 10, at 10. 
41
 Id. at 11. 
42
 Id. at 1. 
8 
imposing artificial caps.”43  The NCAA made two motions in the District Court, a motion to 
dismiss
44
 and a motion to transfer venue.
45
  On February 22, 2011, the District Court granted the 
NCAA’s motion to transfer venue to the Southern District of Indiana and decided not to rule on 
the motion to dismiss.
46
 
After the case was transferred to the Southern District of Indiana, the Plaintiff filed an 
amended complaint
47
 and the NCAA again filed a motion to dismiss.
48
  After oral arguments, on 
September 1, 2011, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana ruled on 
the NCAA’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.49  The 
court found that Agnew failed to plead facts sufficient to sustain the antitrust claim and 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
50
  Agnew’s lawyers have filed an appeal with the 
Seventh Circuit.
51
 
II. Antitrust Law Generally 
A. Conspiracy to Restrain Trade Under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
Section 1 makes illegal “every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade.”52  However, given the broad nature of Section 1 a literal application would lead to all 
                                                 
43
 Id. 
44
 Defendant’s Notice of Motion to Dismiss Complaint (FRCP 12(B)(6)); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion, Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 10-cv-4804 JSW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010), ECF. 
No. 24.  
45
 Defendant’s Notice of Motion to Transfer Venue and Statement of Relief Sought; Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support Thereof, Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 10-cv-4804 JSW (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 22, 2010), ECF No. 22.   
46
 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue at 1, Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 10-cv-
04804 JSW (N.D. Cal Feb. 22, 2011), ECF No. 64.  
47
 Amended Complaint, Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:11-cv-00293-JMS-MJD (S.D. Ind. Mar. 
29, 2011), ECF No. 84. 
48
 Defendant Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Agnew v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:11-cv-00293-JMS-MJD (S.D. Ind. Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 91. 
49
 Order on NCAA’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 1, Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 98744, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011). 
50
 Id. at 1, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744, at *2. 
51
 Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, appeal docketed, No. 11-3066 (7th Cir. Sept.12, 2011). 
52
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).  “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who 
9 
contracts being restraints of trade.
53
  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act “prohibit[s] only unreasonable restraints of trade.”54 
While there is a strong legal presumption against agreements between competitors, not all 
such agreements are harmful to consumers, restrain trade, or are monopolistic.
55
  It is the job of 
antitrust policy to distinguish between agreements that present  “significant anticompetitive 
threats” and those that do not.56  The commonly recognized restraints of trade are (1) naked 
restraints of trade and (2) ancillary restraints.
57
  A naked restraint of trade is defined as a 
“restraint that is thought to have little potential for social benefit, and thus can be condemned 
under a ‘per se’ rule, which requires little or no inquiry into market power or actual 
anticompetitive effects.”58  An ancillary restraint is a restraint that could serve a beneficial 
purpose, and as such is analyzed under the rule of reason, “which means they can be condemned 
only after a relatively elaborate inquiry into power and likely anticompetitive effects.”59 
                                                                                                                                                             
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court.” 
53
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); See, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911): “To hold to 
the contrary would require the conclusion either that every contract, act or combination of any kind or nature, 
whether it operated a restraint on trade or not, was within the statute, and thus the statute would be destructive of all 
right to contract or agree or combine in any respect whatever as to subjects embraced in interstate trade or 
commerce.” 
54
 Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); See also, Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.85, 98 
(1984); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-343 (1982). 
55
 The legislative history of the Sherman Antitrust Act implies “that Congress intended the antitrust laws to protect 
consumers from the high prices and reduced output caused by monopolies and cartels.” HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 59 (4th ed. 2011). 
56
 Id. at 211. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
10 
For a plaintiff to prevail in a civil claim under Section 1, proof of three elements is 
required: “(1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) a resultant unreasonable restraint of 
trade in the relevant market; and (3) an accompanying injury.”60   
B. Standards of Analysis Under Section 1 
 In the years since the Supreme Court first considered Section 1, two main categories of 
violations, and therefore of analysis, have emerged: per se violations and rule of reason 
violations.  Additionally, a third category, the “quick look” analysis, exists as sub-category of the 
traditional rule of reason.   
 1. Per Se Analysis 
 The first standard of analysis applies to practices or agreements that are “so plainly 
anticompetitive that . . . they are ‘illegal per se.’”61  The test for determining whether price fixing 
amounts to per se unlawful price fixing is a test of substance, not of semantics.
62
  The per se rule 
emerged after courts gained experience with certain kinds of restraints, such as price fixing and 
output limitations.
63
  The experience made it possible for them to confidently predict that the 
practice would be condemned under rule of reason and thus apply the presumption that the 
restraint is unreasonable.
64
   
                                                 
60
 Angew, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744 at 8; See also, Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 
(10th Cir. 1998) (“To prevail on a section 1 claim under the Sherman Act, the coaches needed to prove that the 
NCAA (1) participated in an agreement that (2) unreasonably restrained trade in the relevant market.”). 
61
 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) [hereinafter Professional Engineers].  
62
 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1979). 
63
 Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); See Bd. of Regents, 485 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 
(“judicial inexperience with a particular arrangement counsels against extending the reach of per se rules . . . .”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
64
 See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343-44 (1982) (discussing how the inquiry into the reasonableness of a challenged 
practice was made difficult by a Judges’ lack of expert understanding of industrial behavior, and how “once 
experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will 
condemn it,” it has applied the per se rule.). See also Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20 n.33 (discussing why the per se 
rule is not utilized until after the Court has considerable experience with the challenged restraint.) 
11 
The per se rule is utilized when a restraint “facially appears to be one that would always 
or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,”65 such that an “elaborate 
study of the industry” is not needed to establish the practice’s illegality.66  The court analyzing 
the restraint will presume that such a restraint is unreasonable without having to inquire into the 
market context of the restraint.
67
 
In effect, with the per se analysis, the court makes “broad generalizations about the social 
utility of particular commercial practices.”68  The court balances the probability of 
anticompetitive consequences, and their possible severity, against its procompetitive 
consequences and concludes that the conduct in question is almost always anti-competitive.
69
 
One of the most common restraints to which courts apply the per se rule of invalidity is 
price fixing, defined as, “the artificial setting or maintenance of prices at a certain level, contrary 
to the workings of the free market.”70  To be more precise, horizontal price fixing, which is 
defined as “price fixing among competitors on the same level,”71 is among “the activities that the 
Supreme Court has consistently held to be illegal per se,”72 due to the high probability that 
horizontal price fixing and limitations are anticompetitive.
73
 
 However, the “widespread application of the per se rule to price-fixing agreements has 
often obscured the underlying complexities of joint arrangements involving competitors and their 
                                                 
65
 Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20. 
66
 Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) 
67
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984). 
68
 Maricopa, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50, n. 16 
(1977)). 
69
 Id. at 344. 
70
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1309 (9th ed. 2009); see, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., in which the Court 
broadly construed what amounts to price fixing, stating “a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of 
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing [prices] . . . is illegal per se.” 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). The Court 
further held that “Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity” and “to 
the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly interfering with the free play of 
market forces.” Id. at 221. 
71
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1309 (9th ed. 2009). 
72
 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 670 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
73
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100. 
12 
great potential for efficiency.”74  Additionally, the Supreme Court in Broadcast Music held that a 
blanket license agreement, which facially was a horizontal restraint, was not a per se violation 
because its purpose was to increase efficiency and make markets more competitive, not less 
competitive.
75
 
 2. Rule of Reason Analysis 
Of the three standards for determining if an agreement unreasonably restrains trade under 
Section 1, the rule of reason standard is the one most frequently employed.
76
  The Supreme Court 
first defined the parameters of the rule of reason in Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. 
United States,
77
 and since then “the contours of the traditional rule of reason inquiry have 
remained largely unchanged.”78  In Board of Trade, the Supreme Court held that “the legality of 
an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains 
competition.”79  According to the Court, the true test of legality is whether the restraint at issue 
simply regulates, and therefore promotes competition, or whether it suppresses competition.
80
 
Under the rule of reason analysis, the fact-finder, when determining if a restraint should 
be prohibited as an unreasonable restraint on competition, must consider all of the 
circumstances.
81
  There are three distinct steps to a rule of reason analysis: (1) plaintiff must 
allege and prove an anticompetitive effect; (2) if the plaintiff proves an anti-competitive effect, 
                                                 
74
 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 212 (4th ed. 2011). 
75
 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979). 
76
 Sarah M. Konsky, Comment, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1588 
(2003).  
77
 Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246, U.S. 231 (1918). 
78
 Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669. 
79
 Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238; In the lower court, “the case was rested upon the bald proposition, that a rule or 
agreement by which men occupying positions of strength in any branch of trade, fixed prices at which they would 
buy or sell during an important part of the business day, is an illegal restraint of trade under Anti-Trust Law.” Id. 
80
 Id. The Supreme Court put forth the following framework for analysis: “The court must ordinarily consider the 
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was 
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.  The history of the restraint, the evil believed to 
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.” 
Id. 
81
 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 233 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
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then the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the procompetitive qualities of 
conduct outweigh any anticompetitive qualities; and (3) if the defendant offers procompetitive 
justifications, the plaintiff must argue that a less restrictive alternative exists.
82
 
In order to allege and prove an anti-competitive effect, the plaintiff must argue that (1) 
there exists a relevant market for the product at issue; (2) the defendant possesses power within 
said market; and (3) the agreement produced anti-competitive effects within the relevant product 
and geographic markets.
83
  The burden can be satisfied by proving the existence of actual 
anticompetitive effects, such as reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in quality 
of goods and services.
84
  However, because it is often difficult or nearly impossible to provide 
such proof,
85
 courts have allowed the plaintiff or prosecutor to submit “proof of the defendant’s 
‘market power’ instead.”86 
 3.  “Quick Look” Analysis 
 The “quick look” analysis87 amounts to an abbreviated application of the rule of reason 
and is the “intermediate standard”88 between the per se and rule of reason standards.  In quick 
look cases, the restraint seems highly suspicious but it is unclear whether it actually restrains 
trade.
89
  In Board of Regents, Justice Stevens wrote “when there is an agreement not to compete 
in terms of price or output, ‘no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the 
                                                 
82
 See Thomas A. Baker III et al., White v. NCAA: A Chink in the Antitrust Armor, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 
75, 80 (2011) (discussing the breakdown of the Rule of Reason analysis into the three steps: (1) anticompetitive 
effect in a legally cognizable relevant market, (2) procompetitive justifications, (3) less restrictive alternative.) Id. 
83
 Christian Dennie, White Out Fall Grant-in-Aid: An Antitrust Action the NCAA Cannot Afford to Lose, 7 VA. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 97, 112-15 (2007). 
84
 Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (1993). 
85
 See id. (“Such proof is often impossible to make, however, due to the difficulty of isolating the market effects of 
challenged conduct.”). 
86
 Id. 
87
 Sometimes referred to as the “abbreviated rule of reason analysis.” Id. at 669. 
88
 Id. 
89
 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 211 (4th ed. 2011). 
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anticompetitive character of such an agreement,’”90 and that “the rule of reason can sometimes 
be applied in the twinkling of an eye.”91   
In these cases, the courts will not apply the per se standard because it is inappropriate to 
summarily condemn the action, but the full rule of reason analysis is not necessary.
92
  Many 
appellate courts approach the analysis as one of  “shifting burdens of production and proof.”93  
Under the quick look, the plaintiff does not have to go through a detailed market definition or 
analysis.
94
  The market analysis required to establish a prima facie case is simplified by the 
plaintiff showing that the defendant has market power and that the conduct is highly likely to 
have anticompetitive effects, so it is  “unnecessary to go through a full-blown analysis” before 
the burden shifts to the defendant to offer plausible procompetitive justifications.
95
 
The court will presume that the defendant’s conduct has a competitive harm, thus 
requiring the defendant to provide a competitive justification for the restraint.
96
  A valid 
procompetitive justification must be economic in nature; non-economic justifications are not 
cognizable under this test.
97
  If the court finds that the defendant has not offered any legitimate 
justifications, the court will proceed with the presumption that the restraint causes adverse 
competitive impacts, and will find that the restraint violates Section 1.
98
  If, however, the court 
                                                 
90
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984); see Worldwide Basketball and Sport Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 338 F.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing that it is only appropriate to apply the quick look when 
extensive market analysis is not necessary.) 
91
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39. 
92
 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993); Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S at 109. 
93
 Holmes, Antitrust Law Handbook, §2.10. Per se versus rule of reason analysis, pg 8; Law v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998). 
94
 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
95
 Holmes, Antitrust Law Handbook, §2.10. 
96
 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
97
 See generally Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 769-71 (1999) (discussing the development and various 
applications of the quick look analysis). 
98
 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (“If no legitimate justifications are set forth, the 
presumption of adverse competitive impact prevails and ‘the court condemns the practice without ado’. . . . If the 
defendant offers sound procompetitive justifications, however, the court must proceed to weigh the overall 
reasonableness of the restraint using a full-scale rule of reason analysis.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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believes that the defendant has offered a valid procompetitive justification, the court will proceed 
to the full rule of reason analysis to evaluate the overall reasonableness of the conduct.
99
  
III. Collegiate Athletics and Collegiate Financial Aid under Antitrust Law 
A. NCAA v. Board of Regents  
The principal case concerning the application of antitrust law to NCAA regulations and 
actions is NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.  The importance of Board of 
Regents lies not only in the development of the application of the quick-look rule of reason to the 
regulation of intercollegiate athletics, but also in the recognition that the NCAA was not, as 
many believed it to be prior, immune from antitrust law.
100
 
At issue in Board of Regents was the NCAA regulation limiting the number of televised 
football games that could be broadcast each year.
101
  The regulation stemmed from the NCAA’s 
concern that televised football games had an adverse effect on college football attendance and, as 
such, presented a serious threat to the sport.
102
  The plan at issue, the 1981 plan, limited the total 
amount of televised football games for the entire NCAA, as well as the number of games that 
each school could televise.
103
  If a member institution sold television rights outside of the plan, 
the institution was in violation of NCAA rules.
104
 
The NCAA adopted the plan at issue in 1981 for the 1982-1985 football seasons, and 
required that all televised football games of NCAA member universities be in compliance with 
                                                 
99
 Id. 
100
 See Thomas Scully, Note, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma: The NCAA’s Television 
Plan is Sacked by the Sherman Act, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 857, 857 (1985) (“the NCAA continued to elude Sherman 
Act challenges by virtue of its status as a nonprofit, self-regulatory organization that was primarily involved in 
promoting amateur competition, rather than in a purely commercial activity of the type traditionally regulated by the 
Sherman Act.”); see also Susan Marie Kozik, Note, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of 
the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic Association, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 593 (1985). 
101
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1984). 
102
 Id. at 89-90 (discussing the history behind and development of various plans from implementation in 1951 to 
what was the current plan in 1981). 
103
 Id. at 94. 
104
 Id. 
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it.
105
  The plan awarded the rights to negotiate and contract for televised football games to the 
American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS); any 
contract with a network other than ABC or CBS violated NCAA regulations.
106
  The plan 
specified a minimum amount that had to be paid to each member institution for televising the 
games.
107
  However, while the plan did contain different recommended fees for different 
telecasts, it did not account for certain differences in the type of game being televised.
108
 
 Several member universities, who also belonged to the College Football Association 
(CFA), believed that universities should have more say in negotiating television contracts for 
football games, and so the CFA obtained a contract offer from the National Broadcasting 
Company (NBC).
109
  The NCAA threatened to impose sanctions on any member institution that 
complied with the contract.
110
  The resulting litigation ensued.
111
 
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA rule/agreement was clearly 
a horizontal restraint to which the courts would typically apply the per se rule, and presume the 
                                                 
105
 Id. at 91-92. 
106
 Id. at 92-93. 
107
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1984). Under the agreement, both ABC and CBS were granted the right to 
televise 14 live “exposures”, and each network agreed to pay “a specified minimum aggregate compensation” to the 
participating universities during the 4 years, in an amount totaling around $131,750,000. Id. 
108
 The plan set a recommended fee based on the type of game being broadcast in terms of a national telecast (most 
valuable), regional telecast, and Division II and Division III (least valuable). Id. at 93.  However, when determining 
the fee each team received, the NCAA plan did not consider of the number of markets the game was broadcast in, 
the size of the viewing audience, or the teams participating in the game. Id. For example, arguably a game between 
rivals such as Notre Dame and the University of Michigan could have a higher draw than a game between other 
teams, and thus would be worth more to broadcasters, but this was not taken into consideration under the 1981 
NCAA plan. See generally Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 106-07 n.30 (1984) (discussing how the price which a 
telecaster would be willing to pay for a game would be dependent on the variables discussed but the NCAA plan 
was unresponsive to these variables). 
109
 Id. at 94-95. Under the CFA-NBC contract, each institution would have had more televised appearances and 
realized greater revenues. Id. at 95. 
110
 Id. at 95. 
111
 The District Court held that the NCAA’s controls over televising football games violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, and that the NCAA’s actions were those of a classic cartel imposing production limitations. Id. at 95-
96. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the District Court, holding that the plan constituted illegal per se 
price fixing. Id. at 97. The Court of Appeals ultimately rejected all of the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for 
the television plan. Id. at 97-98. 
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restraint unreasonable.
112
  However the Court stated that it was inappropriate to apply a per se 
rule in Board of Regents because in order for the product, intercollegiate athletics, to be available 
horizontal restraints on competition were essential.
113
  Therefore, due to the unique nature of the 
college football industry, the Court opted to apply the “more flexible rule of reason inquiry.”114 
 Under the rule of reason analysis, the Court held both that the plan had a significant 
potential for anticompetitive effects,
115
 and that the anticompetitive effects were apparent.
116
  
The Court rejected the NCAA’s argument that the plan could have no significant anticompetitive 
effects because the NCAA did not possess market power.
117
  Under the Court’s analysis the 
relevant market was college football broadcasts,
118
 and since college football broadcasts are 
defined as a separate market,
119
 it rationally follows that NCAA control
120
 over the broadcasts 
gives the NCAA market power regarding the broadcasts.
121
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 Id. at 99-101. 
113
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-101 (1984). While discussing the characteristics of the industry involved, 
Justice Stevens noted “’some activities can only be carried out jointly. Perhaps the leading example is league 
sports.” Id. at 101 (quoting Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 278 (1978)). 
114
 Id. at 100-03 (while the Court refers to the analysis utilized as a “rule of reason” analysis, the Court actually 
employs the quick-look rule of reason analysis. Because the restraint at issue was a naked restraint, the Court 
dodides not undertake an analysis of the market power of the NCAA. Id. at 109-10); see Scully, supra note 100, at 
871. 
115
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984). 
116
 Id. at 106. 
117
 Id. at 109. 
118
 Id. at 112. 
119
 The Court held that the District Court employed the correct test when it determined that college football 
broadcasts constituted a separate market. Id. at 111. “The proper test is whether there are other products that are 
reasonably substitutable for televised NCAA football games.” Id. The findings of the District court showed that 
college football telecasts “generated an audience uniquely attractive to advertisers” and that advertisers did not have 
substitute programming that attracted a similar audience. Id. 
120
 As evidence of the NCAA’s control, the Court noted that “since as a practical matter all member institutions need 
NCAA approval, members have no real choice but to adhere to the NCAA’s . . . controls.” Id. at 106. The Court 
continued on to say, “Since, as the District Court found, NCAA approval is necessary for any institution that wishes 
to compete in intercollegiate sports, the NCAA has a potent tool at its disposal for restraining institutions which 
require its approval.” Id. at 106 n.31. 
121
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 112 (1984). The Supreme Court went on to further state that the NCAA had 
monopoly power over the market. “When a product is controlled by one interest, without substitutes available in the 
market, there is monopoly power.” Id. (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 
(1956)). 
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In light of the obvious market power that the NCAA possessed, the Court held that the 
agreement was a restraint of trade because it limited the freedom of member universities to 
negotiate their own contracts,
122
 it placed an artificial limit on the quantity of televised football 
games available to broadcasters and consumers,
123
 and created “a price structure that is 
unresponsive to viewer demand and unrelated to the prices that would prevail in a competitive 
market.”124  Therefore, the NCAA’s actions constituted a horizontal restraint of trade and were 
unreasonable as a matter of law.
125
 
B. United States v. Brown University 
Brown University is a leading case concerning the application of antitrust law to the 
administration of financial aid by institutions of higher education,
126
 holding that the provision of 
financial aid by a university is a discount.  In 1958, the eight Ivy League Schools
127
 and 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology agreed to form the “Ivy Overlap Group” (the Group), the 
purpose of which was to make a joint determination about the amount of financial aid to grant 
commonly admitted students.
128
  The Group agreed that they would only offer financial aid
129
 to 
students who demonstrated need and disallowed merit-based aid.
130
 
                                                 
122
 Id. at 98.  
123
 Id. at 99. 
124
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 at 99 (1984). The Court held that the prices being paid were higher and output was 
lower than it would have been, and that both price and output were unresponsive to consumer preference, taking into 
account neither the quality of the teams nor viewer preference of the game. Id. at 106-07. 
125
 Id. at 99. 
126
 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
127
 The eight Ivy League schools are: Harvard University, Yale University, Columbia University, Brown University, 
Cornell University, Princeton University, Dartmouth College, and the University of Pennsylvania. Id. at 662. 
128
 Id. at 662. 
129
 Financial aid in this context refers to financial need based aid; merit based scholarships/aid were not permitted 
under the Ivy Overlap Group agreement. Id. 
130
 Id. 
19 
 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice brought a civil suit against the 
Group, alleging that they violated Section 1 by unlawfully conspiring to restrain trade.
131
  After 
the complaint was filed, the eight Ivy League schools signed a consent decree with the United 
States, leaving only MIT as a defendant.
132
 
 The District Court found that the Overlap Agreement amounted to price fixing, but 
decided not to apply the per se rule of illegality, nor the apply the full rule of reason.
133
  Instead, 
the court applied the abbreviated rule of reason and “took a ‘quick look’ to determine if MIT 
presented any plausible procompetitive defenses that justified the Overlap Agreement.”134  
Ultimately, the court rejected MIT’s procompetitive justifications135 and entered a permanent 
injunction against MIT continuing the practice.
136
  On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the 
district court that, although the agreement was clearly a horizontal restraint,
137
 the per se rule 
was inappropriate due to the nature of the activity.
138
  The court further held that the quick look 
analysis was likewise insufficient because it failed to fully consider the procompetitive 
justifications offered by Brown University, and that, therefore, a full rule of reason analysis was 
required.
139
   
                                                 
131
 Id. at 663-64. The three alleged ways that MIT violated antitrust law were: first, by agreeing to award aid solely 
based on need; second, by using a “common formula” to calculate need; and third, by jointly setting each commonly 
admitted students’ family contribution. Id. 
132
 United States v. Brown Univ, 5 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 1993). 
133
 Id. at 664. 
134
 Id. at 665. 
135
 See Id. at 674. On appeal, MIT argued that the Overlap Agreement has three procompetitive effects/justifications: 
(1) by promoting socio-economic diversity at the school through the provision of need-based aid, the agreement 
improved the quality of education at the school; (2) eliminating merit-based aid increased the financial aid available 
to needy students and therefore “increased consumer choice by making an Overlap education more accessible to a 
greater number of students, id.; and (3) the elimination of price competition for students allowed for competition in 
areas such as curriculum, student-faculty interaction, and campus activities. Id. at 375.  
136
 Id. at 664-65. 
137
 The court stated that, since the purpose of the agreement was to restrain “competitive bidding,” it therefore 
“deprive[d] prospective students of ‘the ability to utilize and compare prices’ in selecting among schools” and was 
“anticompetitive ‘on its face.’” Id. at 673 (quoting Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978)). 
138
 Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993). 
139
 Id. at 678. 
20 
The central issue in Brown University was whether the Overlap Agreement involved 
commerce, and therefore was subject to a Section 1 action.
140
  The determinative question then 
was, is the provision of financial assistance a discount from the full tuition amount, or is it a 
charitable gift.
141
  The court held that because the amount of financial aid that a student receives 
directly determines the amount of tuition the student must pay,
142
 “financial aid therefore is part 
of the commercial process of setting tuition”143 and subject to antitrust analysis.  Further, a joint 
agreement to give a discount among the colleges can be seen as the equivalent of price fixing. 
 During the discussion of MIT’s financial aid policy, the court noted MIT did not dispute 
that the purpose of the Overlap agreement was  “to eliminate price competition for talented 
students among member institutions,”144 and that MIT admitted that it competed with other 
Overlap schools for exclusive students.
145
  Thus, by eliminating price competition for students,
146
 
and in so doing “depriv[ing] prospective students of the ability to utilize and compare prices in 
selecting among schools . . .”147 MIT achieves certain institutional benefits at a bargain.148  Such 
benefits include increased prestige and increased caliber of the student body.
149
  
IV. Analysis
150
 
A. Appropriateness of an application of the full Rule of Reason 
                                                 
140
 Id. at 665. 
141
 Id. at 666. The Court of Appeals further held that if financial aid is a component of setting the price of tuition, 
then it is commerce. Id. 
142
 The price a university charges to a student is the difference between the tuition cost and the amount of financial 
aid awarded. Id. at 666 n.6. Therefore, since the exchange of money for services amounts to a “quintessential 
commercial transaction,” and students pay tuition in exchange for educational services, financial aid is a part of the 
tuition setting process. Id. at 666. 
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 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 1993).  
144
 Id. at 673. 
145
 Id. at 667. 
146
 Id. 
147
 Id. at 673. 
148
 Id. at 667. 
149
 Brown Univ., 5. F.3d 658, 666-67 (1993). 
150
 In light of the fact that Plaintiff Agnew’s amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice under a 12(b)(6) 
motion and is currently pending appeal, this comment analyzes the issue of whether former NCAA Bylaw 15.3.3.1 
violates antitrust law as if the motion had not been granted.  
21 
While, historically, the NCAA was immune from antitrust scrutiny due to its non-profit 
status,
151
 following Board of Regents, in which the Supreme Court questioned the significance of 
the NCAA’s nonprofit status,152 courts now acknowledge that nonprofits can, and do, engage in 
actions that violate Section 1.  Additionally, pursuant to Board of Regents, which recognized 
that, due to the unique nature of college athletics, certain horizontal restraints promulgated by the 
NCAA are entirely necessary in order for the product to exist,
153
 courts do not automatically 
apply the per se analysis to NCAA; instead NCAA rules and regulations are usually analyzed 
under rule of reason.
154
  Given the regulation at issue, a limitation on athletics based financial 
aid, it has been previously articulated that rule of reason analysis is the appropriate analytical 
approach for an antitrust case against the NCAA based upon such regulations.
155
 
B. The One-Year Scholarship Rule Violates Section 1 
Former NCAA Bylaw 15.3.3.1
156
 states  “if a student’s athletic ability is considered in 
any degree in awarding financial aid, such aid shall neither be awarded for a period in excess of 
one academic year nor for a period less than one academic year.”157  As discussed above, a 
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 Scully, supra note 100, at 857; See also, Konsky, supra note 76, at 1589. 
152
 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). 
153
 “Rather, what is critical is that this case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are 
essential if the product is to be available at all.” Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984); See also, Daniel A. 
Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable Nor Necessary: “Amateurism” in Big-Time College Sports, 14 
ABA ANTITRUST 51 (Spring 2000) (“in sports, courts have also ruled that certain types of otherwise per se illegal 
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 See Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable Nor Necessary: “Amateurism” in Big-Time 
College Sports, 14 ABA ANTITRUST 51 (Spring 2000) (“These cases generally have held that sports leagues are 
procompetitive joint ventures necessary to create a product, such as NFL football, so that some level of what would 
otherwise be labeled as collusion is accepted as a procompetitive activity necessary to create the product. 
Consequently, the courts have given these procompetitive joint ventures fairly wide latitude.”) Id.; see also, Law v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (“because some horizontal restraints serve the 
procompetitive purpose of making college sports available, the Supreme Court subjected even the price and output 
restrictions at issue in Board of Regents to a rule of reason analysis.”). 
155
 Baker, supra note 82, at 80.  
156
 Given the increasing likelihood that the multi-year scholarship rule will be approved by a full vote of the member 
institutions in February 2012, this Comment refers to the one-year scholarship rule as the former NCAA bylaw, and 
the proposed NCAA bylaw as the “new scholarship rule”. 
157
 NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at art.15.3.3.1. 
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primary motivation behind enacting the one-year scholarship rule in 1973 was the rising costs of 
intercollegiate athletics and the fear that such prohibitive costs would lead to financial ruin for 
many universities.
158
  
However, enacting a rule whose sole purpose is to decrease costs, and thereby render 
more schools able to “compete” by establishing parity, violates the very principle of a free 
market.
159
  Universities who possess the financial resources to spend more on their athletic 
programs were prevented from using their surplus resources when recruiting and enticing new 
athletes.  
 1. Anticompetitive Effect 
 For an athlete to prove that the NCAA’s one-year scholarship rule had an anticompetitive 
effect under rule of reason analysis, he must define the relevant markets, both geographic and 
product, show that the defendant had market power, and that the defendant’s exertion of such 
market power caused anticompetitive effects.
160
   
Under a Section 1 claim, a relevant market definition contains two aspects: the 
geographic market and the product market.
161
  The geographic market encompasses the area of 
effective competition where buyers can turn for alternative supply sources.
162
  The product 
market includes the pool of goods or services that are reasonably interchangeable in use and have 
cross-elasticity of demand.
163
  Reasonable interchangeability, which is the essential test for 
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 See Crowley, supra note 22. 
159
 See N. Pac. Ry. Co., v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (discussing that the purpose of the Sherman Act was 
to preserve free competition as a central part of trade, and how the Sherman Act “rests on the premise that the 
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 Worldwide Basketball and Sport Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 338 F.3d 955, 959-60 (7th Cir. 
2004) 
161
 Tanaka v. Univ. S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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 Id. 
163
 Id. 
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ascertaining the relevant product market,
164
 can be gauged by (1) the product’s uses or (2) 
consumer response to changes in price level.
165
 
For the issue of whether the former NCAA bylaw violates Section 1, the relevant 
geographic market is the entirety of the United States due to the inherent national nature of 
collegiate sports and the lack of a competing entity.
166
  In Tanaka, the Ninth Circuit stated, given 
the fact that universities throughout the United States heavily recruited Tanaka, Tanaka’s 
“experience strongly suggests that the relevant geographic market is national in scope.”167  The 
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit is applicable to the regulation at issue in Agnew.  It is clear that 
highly recruited student-athletes are more likely to receive multi-year scholarship offers, and the 
fact that they are highly recruited implies that universities from various parts of the country will 
be competing for the students, thus, as in Tanaka, the relevant market is national in scope.  In 
this case, Agnew was recruited by several universities and received formal offers from colleges 
across the country,
168
 and therefore, similar to the plaintiff in Tanaka, the relevant market is 
national in scope.  
One of the largest hurdles that student-athlete plaintiffs face in a Section 1 claim is 
establishing a relevant market for their services as athletes.
169
  A fatal flaw in the Agnew 
complaint is that the product market is alleged to be that of bachelor’s degrees offered by 
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 White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hospitality Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1983). 
165
 Worldwide Basketball and Sport Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 338 F.3d 955, 962 (7th Cir. 2004) 
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 Amended Complaint, supra note 47, at 3. Rice University in Houston, Texas, Brigham Young University in 
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universities.
170
  This product market is not only illogical given the circumstances,
171
 but also fails 
to satisfy the requirements for a sufficiently alleged market.  The Agnew case attempts to frame 
the issue in terms of a typical output market, where the restraint is aimed at limiting the price or 
output of the product in question.  When it comes to financial aid for student-athletes, however, 
the market is not an output market, but rather an input market for the services of student athletes.  
While courts have traditionally been hesitant to acknowledge that a labor market exists for 
student-athlete services, there is a growing inclination to recognize such a market.
172
  
In In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation (Walk on Football Players 
Litigation), the plaintiffs argued that, but for the NCAA bylaw restricting the number of football 
scholarships each school is able to award to eighty-five, they would have received full grant-in-
aid scholarships.
173
  In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court held that the 
plaintiff’s definition of the relevant market as “Division I-A football” was sufficient and that the 
Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged an input market “in which NCAA member schools compete for 
skilled amateur football players.”174  NCAA DI football players are a key, if not vital, input in 
the production, and therefore output of, college football.  Just like other businesses that create a 
product for public use or consumption, “universities must attract the human resources necessary 
to operate.  This inevitably involves competing for desired resources with those offering a 
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similar product.”175  The plaintiffs in White v. NCAA established a similar relevant market, 
defining it as an input market for the services of student-athletes at Major College Football and 
Major College Basketball universities in the United States.
176
 
 As in Walk on Football Players Litigation and White, the relevant input market for 
Agnew, as well as for other NCAA DI athletes hoping to challenge the former restrictions on 
grants-in-aid, is an input market for the services of the student athletes in their particular sport at 
DI colleges in the United States.  The fact that a single product market exits is not fatal to a 
plaintiff’s claim.177 
 After establishing a relevant market, student-athlete plaintiffs are required to demonstrate 
that the NCAA possesses market power in the defined relevant market.  Proving the NCAA’s 
market power regarding intercollegiate athletics is a minor issue.  Market power is defined as the 
ability of an organization to affect the price members pay for goods or services.
178
  The NCAA 
undisputedly has extensive, if not complete, control over intercollegiate athletics,
179
 and has 
virtually no competition for control.  This control is not limited to just game rules and standards, 
but extends to control over the market for student athletes,
180
 a market on which NCAA member 
institutions are dependent for recruiting talent.  In essence, the NCAA acts as a cartel and thus, 
has market power. 
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Finally, student-athlete plaintiffs are required to show the anticompetitive effects of the 
NCAA’s actions.  In general, the test for anticompetitive effect “is whether consumer welfare has 
been harmed such that there has been a decrease in allocative efficiency and an increase in 
price.”181  As in Walk on Football Players Litigation, the market alleged here is a monopsony182 
over the student-athlete services market and injury to competition can occur by monopsony just 
as it may result from monopoly.
183
  The NCAA’s cartel-like actions prohibited price competition 
in the form of multi-year scholarships.  This prohibition lowered the amount of financial aid 
available, in terms of years, for universities to negotiate with, and thus lead to allocative 
inefficiencies in the market for student services.   
  Additional anticompetitive effects of the one-year scholarship rule are quite clear in 
light of some of the scholarships offers that the 2012 class of recruits received under the new 
multi-year rule.  The impact of the pending NCAA scholarship legislation, which applies to all 
aid agreements that take effect August 1, 2012,
184
 is already visible.  The DI Board of Directors 
reaffirmed the multi-year scholarship legislation on January 14, 2012,
185
 and less than three 
weeks later, on National Signing Day, February 1, 2012, several universities confirmed that they 
awarded four-year scholarships to the 2012 class of recruits.
186
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 The former rule deprived student-athletes of the ability to choose a school based on price 
considerations because the NCAA, by limiting the amount of financial aid that could be awarded, 
prevented the free market from establishing the market value for an athlete’s abilities.187  Jointly 
determined maximum limits on the financial incentives universities may offer to athletes 
deprives talented athletes of the opportunity “to receive offers of greater financial benefits from 
universities which have an independent economic incentive to do so.”188  In a free market 
system, student-athletes would receive aid awards proportionate to the student’s worth to the 
university, thus enabling a student-athlete to take financial aid into consideration when choosing 
their college.
189
  The NCAA’s former regulation prohibiting multi-year scholarships, however, 
did not allow for this.  As in Law v. NCAA and NCAA v. Board of Regents, in which the schools 
negotiated individually within the constraints of the price agreements,
190
 universities negotiate 
individually with players regarding their scholarships within the confines of the NCAA bylaws.  
Thus, the NCAA bylaws directly dictate the limitations on the market price for the services of DI 
student-athletes. 
The powerhouses of college athletics, universities like Alabama, Michigan, and Ohio 
State, are schools that are able to offer four-year athletic scholarships and will use their large 
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budgets as an advantage when making offers to new recruits.
191
  When deciding between two 
schools, one that offers a four-year athletic scholarship, and one that offers a renewable one-year 
scholarship, with all other things being equal, a high school senior will likely choose the school 
that gave the four-year grant.  Therefore, in order to remain competitive in NCAA DI athletics, 
schools need to sign top-recruits, and in order to sign top recruits universities must meet the 
demands of the market and offer four-year scholarships.  The NCAA’s pending legislation on 
scholarship rules addresses this defect in the NCAA bylaws, and allows the market to be subject 
to demand and promote competition among schools for top athletes, where as the restriction at 
issue did not. 
2. Procompetitive Justifications 
If the plaintiff athletes sufficiently allege the anticompetitive effects of the one-year 
limitation on athletic scholarships, the burden shifts to the defendant NCAA to put forth the 
procompetitive qualities of the restriction and demonstrate that the justifications of the conduct 
outweigh the anticompetitive qualities of the prohibition on multi-year scholarships.
192
  The 
procompetitive justifications typically offered by the NCAA are the defense of amateurism of 
student-athletes, parity among athletics programs, and reduction of costs.
193
 
The District Court in Walk on Football Players Litigation succinctly dismissed the 
NCAA’s argument that the scholarship regulations implicated the protection of amateurism such 
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that they were not subject to Section 1.
194
  The Court found that the scholarship limitation did not 
involve the same types of conduct that rules requiring class attendance and revoking eligibility 
for entering a professional draft did, and therefore the numerical scholarship limitation “was not 
on all fours” with prior case law concerning NCAA eligibility rules.195  Further, the NCAA can 
no longer attempt to justify the prohibition of multi-year scholarships as a protection of 
amateurism given the new rule allowing multi-year scholarships.
196
  If providing multi-year 
grants-in-aid posed a true threat to the amateurism of student-athletes, the NCAA would not have 
changed the bylaws to allow for it.  
That leaves the original purpose for the one-year scholarship rule.  Cutting costs.  The 
justifications of parity among athletics programs and reduction of costs can be addressed 
together as they both address similar concerns.  Parity among athletics programs is great in 
theory but likely not achievable in actuality.  For the NCAA to argue that certain regulations, like 
the one-year scholarship rule, promote parity ignores not only the entire premise of 
intercollegiate athletics, but also the unavoidable disparities in university athletics spending. 
Intercollegiate athletics competitions are based upon the notion that schools are not on par with 
one another, that one school is better than other and therefore will defeat the less able school in 
an athletic competition.  Typically, the schools that are the “better” schools are the ones with 
larger athletics budgets, and these schools will not cut their budgets to achieve parity.  
Furthermore, a cap on the number of years a school can guarantee a scholarship does 
little towards reaching parity.  Just because a school was prohibited from promising a four-year 
scholarship up front, does not mean that a university will not ultimately end up providing a four-
year scholarship to an athlete, and therefore will, in due course, end up spending the same 
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amount of money on scholarships.  Nor does the one-year scholarship rule permit a university to 
provide a greater number of scholarships than the multi-year scholarship rule.  
Cutting the costs of intercollegiate athletics is nothing more than a pipe dream.  In total, 
intercollegiate athletics generates approximately $3 billion in annual revenue.
197
  The capitalized 
economic values of some major university athletics programs are estimated to be comparable to 
some major professional sports franchises.
198
  In Law, the court held that the NCAA’s 
procompetitive justification that the rule limiting the salary of certain entry level DI basketball 
coaches would cut costs was not itself valid.  The NCAA proffered the argument that the rule 
was intended to prevent schools from trying to “keep up with the Joneses,” but the Court of 
Appeals stated that “if holding down costs by the exercise of market power over suppliers, rather 
than just by increased efficiency, is a procompetitive effect justifying joint conduct, then Section 
1 can never apply to input markets or buyer cartels. This is not and cannot be the law.”199  
Therefore, the procompetitive justification of reducing costs for university athletics programs is 
insufficient under a Section 1 cause of action.
 200
   
3. Less Restrictive Alternative 
 The third step in the rule of reason analysis considers the existence of less restrictive 
alternative approaches to the regulation at issue that accomplish the procompetitive justifications 
put forth by the defendant.
201
  This step is only necessary when the defendant convinces the court 
that the procompetitive benefits outweigh the anticompetitive effects.
202
  It is unlikely that the 
NCAA would be able to convince a court that the procompetitive justifications outweigh the 
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anticompetitive aspects given the NCAA’s recent change of course on grant-in-aid policy.  Not 
only has the NCAA decided to allow multi-year grants-in-aid, but the DI Board of Directors also 
decided to permit schools to offer a stipend up to the full cost of attendance, the issue central to 
cases such as White v. NCAA.
203
  If procompetitive reasons justified allowing scholarships to 
cover less than full cost and allowing scholarships to only last for one year at a time, the NCAA 
would not have changed its policies.  Thus, there is no need to consider less restrictive 
alternatives. 
 4. Proposed Remedy 
 While the NCAA’s violation of Section 1 has been addressed for future athletes with the 
pending passage of the new scholarship bylaw, current and former student athletes were still 
harmed by the one-year rule and have been given no recourse.  The NCAA should revoke the 
one-year grant-in-aid limitation for all current student-athletes and make the new grant-in-aid 
rule retroactive for all student athletes.  The NCAA DI Board of Directors stated that the 
scholarship rule change was adopted to improve student-athlete well-being.
204
  If this is the case, 
and athlete well being is the motivation behind multi-year grants-in-aid, then it should apply to 
all student-athletes, not just the student athletes who matriculate in Fall 2012. 
For student-athletes who lost their scholarships after an injury or after being replaced on 
the team because of a coaching change or new recruit class, a cause of action should be conferred 
under Section 1.  While it may be difficult for a plaintiff student-athlete to prove that, but for the 
one-year limitation, they would have received a multi-year scholarship, they should be provided 
the opportunity to present evidence supporting their claim.  A highly recruited student athlete 
would have received offers from several universities and, given the high level of media attention 
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that such student athletes receive, it would be possible for such an athlete to show that, as a result 
of the competition among universities to sign the athlete, he or she would have received a multi-
year scholarship.
205
  
V. Aside – Ramifications of the NCAA’s New Scholarship Rule 
 In light of the fact that many major universities across the country currently face funding 
deficits and substantial budget cuts, the NCAA’s new scholarship rule will likely lead to severe 
budget issues and constraints for many universities.  Universities will essentially face a Catch 22.  
University athletics departments produce a substantial amount of revenue, but in order to remain 
competitive and bring in said revenue, the schools now need to recruit athletes with multi-year 
athletic scholarship offers.
206
  This will end up requiring more funding from university financial 
aid.  Since the financial aid budget will either, (1) need to be increased, meaning that money is 
taken from other areas such as academics and curriculum development, or (2) remain stagnant, 
implying that fewer funds are available for non-athletic scholarships, the university will have to 
make cuts in at least one area.  If a university does not make the necessary cuts because they 
cannot afford to reduce funding to other areas, the athletic program will suffer and eventually 
revenues will decrease, ultimately impacting the university’s bank account even further.   
 Here in New Jersey, there has been incredible backlash for Rutgers University after 
several articles came out declaring that Rutgers was simultaneously cutting spending on 
academics while increasing funding to athletics.
207
  During the 2009-2010 fiscal year, Rutgers 
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spent more money on athletics than any other public institution in the six biggest football 
conferences, and more than forty percent of the sports revenue “came from student fees and the 
university’s general fund.”208  $26.9 million dollars was given to subsidize athletics during fiscal 
year 2010.
209
  Of that, only $18.4 million came from the university bank account.  Where did the 
remaining $8.4 million come from?  That came from student fees.
210
 
 This comment is not arguing that it is right for students at public universities to have their 
education compromised for the benefit of sports, it isn’t.  The NCAA consistently lauds itself for 
having its primary goal be the education of its student-athletes; that they are students first, 
athletes second.  However, neither is it right for the NCAA and university athletics programs 
across the country to violate federal antitrust law in order to save money.  As compelling of an 
argument as cost cutting is, it does not justify a violation of antitrust law. 
Conclusion 
Intercollegiate athletics are inextricably engrained in American culture.  Every fall, all 
across the country, thousands of university students and alumni flock to football stadiums to 
cheer on their team against a rival school.  It is in pursuit of this school spirit, and revenue, that 
athletics programs recruit top student-athletes for their teams.  Prior to October 2011, NCAA 
member universities were able to recruit these star student-athletes without being subject to the 
demands of the marketplace because there was a prohibition on the duration of athletic 
scholarships.  With the one-year scholarship rule in place, coaches, and by extension universities, 
were prevented from engaging in bidding wars with other universities over top-recruits.  The rule 
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violated the principles of a free market by precluding student-athletes from considering offers of 
multi-year financial aid, which, likely would have been offered to top-athletes but for the NCAA 
bylaw.  The plaintiff student-athletes, under the rule of reason analysis, would be able to show 
the existence of a relevant market for their services, the existence of the NCAA’s market power 
in controlling financial aid limitations, and the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s use of its 
market power.  Therefore, antitrust actions by former student-athletes who were previously 
harmed by the NCAA’s one-year scholarship rule should be upheld as violations of Section 1.   
 
